Understanding The Crisis

Mass Deaths Under King Leopold II's Congo Free State (1885–1908)

During the Congo Free State under King Leopold II (1885–1908), an estimated 1 million to 15 million people died due to forced labor, mass executions, starvation, and disease. The demand for rubber and ivory led to systematic human rights abuses, where Congolese who failed to meet quotas were often mutilated or killed. The combination of brutal punishments and the spread of diseases such as smallpox and sleeping sickness significantly reduced the population (Hochschild, 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

Belgian Colonial Rule and Continued Exploitation (1908–1960)

Under Belgian colonial rule (1908–1960), forced labor and economic exploitation continued, leading to high mortality rates due to malnutrition, poor healthcare, and continued abuses. Though the exact number of deaths remains uncertain, the colonial administration maintained extractive policies that prioritized resource exploitation over the well-being of the local population (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Renton, Seddon, & Zeilig, 2007).

Post-Independence Turmoil and Foreign Interventions (1960s–1997)

Following independence in 1960, the DRC was plunged into political turmoil, exacerbated by foreign interventions and Cold War geopolitics. The assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961, orchestrated with the involvement of Belgium and the United States, led to a prolonged period of instability and authoritarian rule under Mobutu Sese Seko. Throughout the Mobutu regime (1965–1997), opposition was violently suppressed, and state corruption resulted in economic collapse and widespread suffering (Gondola, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

The Second Congo War (1998–2003): Africa's Deadliest Conflict

The Second Congo War (1998–2003), often referred to as Africa's World War, became one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II, resulting in an estimated 5.4 million deaths. The war involved multiple foreign powers, including Rwanda, Uganda, and Western-backed interests, and was driven by the struggle to control Congo's vast mineral wealth. The majority of deaths were caused by starvation, disease, and displacement resulting from the war (International Rescue Committee, 2008; Prunier, 2009).

Ongoing Conflicts and Resource Wars (2003–Present)

In the 21st century, ongoing conflicts involving armed groups such as the March 23 Movement (M23), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and other militias, often backed by foreign governments and private companies, have continued to fuel violence. The competition for control over resources such as coltan, gold, and diamonds has led to further displacement, mass killings, and human rights abuses, with hundreds of thousands of deaths recorded (Stearns, 2013; United Nations Security Council, 2025).

The Lasting Legacy of Foreign Exploitation in the DRC

Over the past century, the cumulative impact of colonization, Cold War interventions, and resource-driven conflicts has resulted in tens of millions of Congolese deaths over the past century. These figures underscore the deep and devastating legacy of foreign exploitation and intervention in the DRC, making it one of the most historically affected regions by imperialist violence and economic extraction.

The Refugee Crisis and Regional Tensions

By mid-1994, international efforts to address the refugee crisis proved inadequate, as armed elements of the former Rwandan government forces (FAR) and Interahamwe militia reorganized within Congolese territory (Lemarchand, 2009). Rather than dismantling these armed groups, humanitarian agencies unintentionally facilitated their resurgence by providing aid to camps controlled by ex-FAR and Interahamwe leaders (Human Rights Watch, 1997). Meanwhile, the influx of refugees placed significant pressure on local Congolese communities, exacerbating ethnic tensions between Hutu refugees and indigenous groups such as the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis) in South Kivu (Autesserre, 2010).

Rwanda's Invasion of Zaire (1996)

Claiming security concerns, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), under President Paul Kagame, launched an invasion of eastern Zaire in late 1996 with Ugandan support (Stearns, 2011). While the official justification was to dismantle the refugee camps harboring génocidaires, Rwanda's military operations went far beyond self-defense. The RPA and allied rebel forces, including Laurent-Désiré Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), massacred thousands of Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians, leaving a trail of destruction (UNHCR, 2000). Reports from the United Nations suggest that these attacks could amount to crimes against humanity, as entire refugee populations were hunted down in forests and slaughtered (United Nations, 1998).

The Fall of Mobutu and the Consequences for Congo

The 1996 invasion rapidly escalated into a full-scale war against President Mobutu Sese Seko's regime, which had ruled Zaire for over three decades. By mid-1997, Kabila's Rwandan-backed forces had successfully ousted Mobutu, leading to the renaming of Zaire as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, Rwanda's involvement did not end with Mobutu's fall. Instead, it marked the beginning of prolonged foreign exploitation, as Rwanda and Uganda maintained a military presence in eastern Congo under the guise of eliminating remaining Hutu militias (International Crisis Group, 2010). This intervention would later fuel the Second Congo War, ensuring continued instability in the region.

A Manufactured Crisis for Foreign Interests

The 1994-1996 period illustrates how Rwanda's military intervention, initially framed as a necessary security operation, served broader geopolitical and economic interests. The systematic dismantling of refugee camps, massacres of displaced populations, and Rwanda's support for rebel groups in Congo all point to a deliberate strategy of regional domination. The Congolese people have paid the heaviest price, bearing the brunt of foreign interventions, resource exploitation, and war. Moving forward, addressing the legacy of the genocide's spillover requires genuine accountability for the role of external actors in perpetuating conflict in the DRC.

October 1996: The War Begins

In October 1996, the Rwandan government, led by Paul Kagame, launched a military offensive into eastern Zaire. The operation was aimed at dismantling the Hutu militias, including the Interahamwe, which had taken refuge in Zaire following the genocide. These militias had been using refugee camps as operational bases to launch attacks on Rwanda, prompting the government to take decisive military action (Prunier, 2009). Rwanda was soon joined by Uganda, another regional power seeking to weaken Mobutu's regime, which had allowed these groups to operate freely within Zaire's borders. Other African countries, including Angola, Burundi, and Eritrea, also became involved in the conflict (Reyntjens, 2009).

The Rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila

With the conflict intensifying, a rebel coalition known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) emerged under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. A long-time opponent of Mobutu, Kabila found strong backing from Rwanda and Uganda, who provided arms, training, and logistical support (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). As the AFDL rapidly advanced westward, city after city fell, often with little resistance from Mobutu's forces, which were plagued by corruption and disorganization (Stearns, 2011).

The Fall of Mobutu

By early 1997, the situation for Mobutu had become dire. His once-powerful army crumbled under the coordinated assault of the AFDL and its foreign allies. In May 1997, as rebel forces closed in on Kinshasa, Mobutu fled into exile, first to Togo and then to Morocco, where he died a few months later (Human Rights Watch, 1997). On May 16, 1997, Kabila and his forces entered the capital, declaring the end of the Zairian state and renaming it the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The war had seemingly come to a close, but instability loomed on the horizon.

Aftermath and Unresolved Tensions

Despite his military success, Kabila's rule soon faced challenges. Many Congolese resented the heavy influence of Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the new government, fueling suspicions that the country was under foreign control. In 1998, tensions escalated when Kabila expelled Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the country, effectively severing ties with his former allies. This act triggered the Second Congo War, a conflict even more destructive than the first (Turner, 2007).

October 1996: The War Begins

In October 1996, the Rwandan government, led by Paul Kagame, launched a military offensive into eastern Zaire. The operation was aimed at dismantling the Hutu militias, including the Interahamwe, which had taken refuge in Zaire following the genocide. These militias had been using refugee camps as operational bases to launch attacks on Rwanda, prompting the government to take decisive military action (Prunier, 2009). Rwanda was soon joined by Uganda, another regional power seeking to weaken Mobutu's regime, which had allowed these groups to operate freely within Zaire's borders. Other African countries, including Angola, Burundi, and Eritrea, also became involved in the conflict (Reyntjens, 2009).

The Rise of Laurent-Désiré Kabila

With the conflict intensifying, a rebel coalition known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) emerged under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. A long-time opponent of Mobutu, Kabila found strong backing from Rwanda and Uganda, who provided arms, training, and logistical support (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). As the AFDL rapidly advanced westward, city after city fell, often with little resistance from Mobutu's forces, which were plagued by corruption and disorganization (Stearns, 2011).

The Fall of Mobutu

By early 1997, the situation for Mobutu had become dire. His once-powerful army crumbled under the coordinated assault of the AFDL and its foreign allies. In May 1997, as rebel forces closed in on Kinshasa, Mobutu fled into exile, first to Togo and then to Morocco, where he died a few months later (Human Rights Watch, 1997). On May 16, 1997, Kabila and his forces entered the capital, declaring the end of the Zairian state and renaming it the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The war had seemingly come to a close, but instability loomed on the horizon.

Aftermath and Unresolved Tensions

Despite his military success, Kabila's rule soon faced challenges. Many Congolese resented the heavy influence of Rwandan and Ugandan forces in the new government, fueling suspicions that the country was under foreign control. In 1998, tensions escalated when Kabila expelled Rwandan and Ugandan troops from the country, effectively severing ties with his former allies. This act triggered the Second Congo War, a conflict even more destructive than the first (Turner, 2007).

CNDP Expansion and Human Rights Abuses

The CNDP expanded rapidly across North Kivu, gaining territorial control through military offensives while engaging in widespread human rights abuses, massacres, and illicit economic activities. The rebellion also targeted civilian populations, particularly Hutu communities suspected of opposing CNDP rule (United Nations Security Council, 2008; Stearns, 2012). The CNDP also imposed illegal taxes on civilians, traders, and transporters, generating revenue that directly benefited Rwanda's economic interests (United Nations Security Council, 2008).

International Response and Rwanda's Evasion of Consequences

UN reports provided substantial evidence that Rwandan military officers actively coordinated CNDP operations, supplying arms, training fighters, and allowing rebel forces to retreat into Rwanda when under pressure. Despite mounting evidence from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, Rwanda consistently denied involvement and successfully evaded major international consequences due to its close diplomatic ties with the United States and the United Kingdom, both of whom saw Rwanda as a stabilizing force in the Great Lakes region( Reyntjens, 2010).

Humanitarian Impact and War Crimes

Clashes between CNDP forces and UN peacekeepers (MONUC) in 2008 led to war crimes. The conflict also forced thousands of people to flee their homes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region(United Nations Security Council, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008). The CNDP's military campaign had a catastrophic humanitarian impact.

Kiwanja Massacre and Ethnic Cleansing

One of the most notorious atrocities was the Kiwanja Massacre (November 2008), where at least 150 civilians were executed by CNDP forces (Human Rights Watch. (2008). Additionally, the group carried out ethnic cleansing campaigns in Masisi and Rutshuru. The forced recruitment of child soldiers and the systematic use of sexual violence further underscored the CNDP's brutality.

The Rise of M23 and Continued Regional Destabilization

By 2009, facing mounting international pressure, Rwanda brokered a deal to integrate CNDP fighters into the Congolese military. This move allowed Rwanda to maintain indirect control over eastern DRC, as many former CNDP commanders retained influence within the national army. However, the legacy of the CNDP rebellion did not end with its dissolution (United Nations Security Council, 2009). In 2012, ex-CNDP fighters formed the March 23 Movement (M23), continuing Rwanda's proxy warfare in the region and further destabilizing the Great Lakes region (United Nations Security Council, 2012; Stearns, 2012).

M23's Capture of Goma and Human Rights Abuses

The M23 rebellion peaked in November 2012 with the capture of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers (MONUSCO). During its first occupation, M23 committed widespread human rights abuses, including mass executions, forced child soldier recruitment, looting, and systematic sexual violence (United Nations Security Council, 2012; Stearns, 2013; UNHCR, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Despite overwhelming evidence of Rwanda's involvement, including reports from the UN, Human Rights Watch, and other Reports, Rwanda denied its role and evaded prosecution.

M23's Defeat and Rwanda's Continued Influence (2013)

Under mounting pressure from the UN, U.S., and EU, Rwanda withdrew direct support for M23 in 2013, allowing the Congolese army (FARDC) and MONUSCO to launch a counter-offensive, leading to M23's defeat in November 2013. Many M23 leaders fled to Rwanda and Uganda, where they received protection, indicating Rwanda's continued complicity. Rwanda also used diplomatic channels to block the prosecution of M23 leaders and pressured the DRC government to grant amnesty, allowing ex-rebels to reintegrate into the Congolese army and maintain Rwandan influence in eastern DRC (United Nations Security Council, 2013;United Nations Security Council, 2014).

M23's Resurgence (2021–2025)

Despite its 2013 defeat, M23 resurfaced in 2021, again linked to Rwandan support. Renewed fighting in 2022–2025 saw M23 capture strategic towns in North and South Kivu, including Goma, Bukavu , Rutshuru, Bunagana, and Nyabibwe, key mining hubs. UN and security think tanks have reported Rwanda's continued military support, including troops, weapons, and logistics, driven by its desire to control mineral wealth and counter hostile armed groups near its border (United Nations Security Council, 2025; International Crisis Group, 2025).

Humanitarian Impact of the Renewed M23 Conflict

The humanitarian impact of the renewed M23 conflict has been severe, with thousands killed, over 500,000 displaced, and documented war crimes, including executions, mass rapes, and forced recruitment of child soldiers (United Nations Security Council, 2025; Reuters, 2025; Human Rights Watch, 2023).

The Path to Resolution

Resolving the crisis requires sustained international pressure, war crimes accountability, and a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region (United Nations Security Council, 2025).

Formation and Early Years (1995-2000)

The ADF formed in 1995 as a merger of several rebel factions, including the Allied Democratic Movement, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and militant members of the Tablighi Jamaat movement. Jamil Mukulu, a former Catholic who converted to Islam, became the group's main figure.

The ADF's members were largely Muslims from the Baganda and Basoga ethnic groups, portraying themselves as religious crusaders motivated by political and socio-economic grievances. The group aimed to establish an Islamic state in Uganda. The ADF received support from the Sudanese government and Zaire, which sought to undermine the Ugandan government (Global Conflict Tracker). Taking advantage of the terrain and local ethnic tensions, the ADF established a stronghold in western Uganda.

The group launched attacks in Uganda, including a series of bombings in Kampala during the late 1990s. In response, the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) launched military offensives against the ADF in eastern DRC during the First and Second Congo Wars (1996–2003).

Shift in Focus and Activities (2001-2012)

By 2001, the ADF was significantly weakened and sought to remobilize in the remote terrain of eastern DRC. The group's objectives shifted from overthrowing the Ugandan government to survival and economic integration.

The ADF developed economic stakes in the transborder Rwenzori region, engaging in markets such as timber, gold mining, and agriculture to generate revenue (George Washington University). This period saw a decline in direct militant activity as the group focused on economic sustenance.

Resurgence and Radicalization (2013-2019)

In 2013, the ADF renewed its attacks, primarily targeting the Congolese military. In 2015, ADF leader Jamil Mukulu fled to Tanzania, where he was arrested and later extradited to Uganda. Under new leader Musa Baluku, the group became increasingly radical and brutal in its operations.

By 2017, ADF factions began forging connections with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In 2019, a major faction pledged allegiance to ISIL, forming the Islamic State's Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The U.S. Department of State designated the ADF as a foreign terrorist organization in March 2021 under the name "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC)" (Country Reports on Terrorism 2019).

ADF as ISCAP (2019-Present)

As ISCAP, the ADF has carried out numerous attacks on civilians, the FARDC, and UN peacekeepers. Despite military operations, internal divisions, and leadership shifts, the group remains a persistent insurgency.

In 2020, Musa Baluku declared that the ADF had fully incorporated itself into ISCAP, though some elements of the group reportedly rejected allegiance to the Islamic State and split into different factions (Security Council).

Recent Congolese government operations against the ADF have strengthened the national military's role in the conflict, but some observers believe that elements within the Congolese armed forces contribute to ongoing instability.

In April 2024, a joint operation between the armies of the DRC and Uganda resulted in the neutralization of two high-ranking ADF leaders.

Historical Background

The Hema and Lendu communities co-existed for centuries, engaging in minor disputes over land without large-scale violence. The Hema, believed to have migrated from Uganda's Bunyoro region in the 17th century, settled in two waves: the Gegere, who integrated among the Lendu, and the South Hema, who settled near Kasenyi and retained their Nyoro language (Pottier, 2010).

Colonial and Post-Colonial Influences

During Belgian colonial rule, the administration favored the Hema, granting them administrative roles, educational opportunities, and land ownership rights, which marginalized the Lendu (Mwesigwa Mugisa,2010). The 1973 Land Reform Law under Mobutu Sese Seko enabled land purchases that disproportionately benefited the Hema, displacing many Lendu farmers (Turner, 2007; Camm, 2012). The collapse of the Congolese state in the 1990s further deepened these tensions, leading to violent confrontations (Turner, 2007).

Escalation During the Second Congo War (1998–2003)

The Second Congo War intensified the conflict, with Uganda and Rwanda supporting opposing armed groups. Uganda backed Hema militias such as the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), which sought Hema dominance over Ituri, while Lendu militias like the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) formed in response (Stearns, 2015; Autesserre, 2010).

New groups later emerged, including the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), responsible for attacks against Hema communities (Stearns, 2015). International actors, particularly Uganda and Rwanda, played a major role in sustaining the conflict due to economic interests in Ituri's resource-rich regions (Lemarchand, 2009).

Current Situation and Humanitarian Crisis

The conflict remains unresolved, with over 7,000 deaths recorded since January 2025 and approximately 450,000 people displaced due to ongoing violence. The resurgence of M23 rebels, backed by the Rwandan military, has contributed to increased instability in Ituri (United Nations, 2023). Efforts by MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission, and the Congolese government have struggled to contain the violence (International Crisis Group, 2006).

Academic Publications

• Autesserre, S. (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge University Press.

• Lemarchand, R. (2009). The dynamics of violence in Central Africa. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(4), 672-694.

• Prunier, G. (2009). Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe. Oxford University Press.

• Reyntjens, F. (2009). The Great African War: Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596698

• Stearns, J. K. (2012). Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the great war of Africa. PublicAffairs.

Reports and Documents

• Amnesty International. (2003). On the precipice: The deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/006/2003/en/

• Human Rights Watch. (2005). The curse of gold: Plundering of natural resources in eastern Congo. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/

• International Rescue Committee. (2008). Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis. https://www.rescue.org/report/mortality-democratic-republic-congo-ongoing-crisis

• United Nations Security Council. (2022). Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2022/887). https://undocs.org/S/2022/887

Recent Updates

• Amnesty International. (2023). The humanitarian toll of the renewed M23 insurgency in North Kivu. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/reports/

• International Crisis Group. (2025). Fall of DRC's Goma: Urgent Action Needed to Avert a Regional War. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war

• United Nations Security Council. (2025). Report on the evolving security crisis in the eastern DRC. https://undocs.org/S/2025/1021